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Making the State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions
and International Support for Criminal Investigations in
Post-Armed Conflict Guatemala
Naomi Roht-Arriaza*
In November 2006, a local trial court in Guatemala's capital ordered the
arrest of the country's ex-President, Oscar Mejia Victores, along with ex-
Defense Minister Anibal Guevara, ex-Police Chief Germin Chupina, and ex-
head of the Secret Police Pedro Arredondo on charges of genocide, torture,
enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and terrorism.' The defendants,
along with two others whose arrest warrants were not executed, were deeply
implicated in the conceptualization and execution of a repressive state strategy
that resulted in the deaths of two hundred thousand Guatemalans and the
destruction of over four hundred villages. Although the arrest order was carried
out through a Guatemalan court, it was issued by a Spanish judge,2 Santiago
Pedraz. Judge Pedraz of Spain's Audiencia Nacional3 issued the warrants in July
2006, followed by formal extradition requests. He based Spanish jurisdiction
over crimes committed by Guatemalans in Guatemala on a Spanish law that
allows universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes.
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author is a member
of the Legal Advisory Council of the Center for Justice and Accountability and has been a
member of the legal team involved in the Spanish Genocide case litigation since 2006. Many
thanks to Almudena Bernabeu, International Attorney at CJA and the heart of the legal team, for
comments and inspiration.
I Jos6 Elias, Tres militares y un civil Guatemaltecos, en el banquillo, El Pas (Spain) (Nov 14, 2006),
available online at <http://www.elpais.com/articulo/intemacional/miltares/civil/guatemaltecos
/banquiUo/elpporint/20061114elpepuint_4/Tes/> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
2 Ministerio de Judicia, Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n No. 1, Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias
Previas 331/1999-10, Spain (July 7, 2006), available online at <http://www.i-dem.org/docs/
OrdendecapturaRiosMontt.doc> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
3 The Audiencia Nacional hears cases involving drug smuggling, terrorism, state corruption, and
international crimes that cannot adequately be dealt with at the level of provinces and
autonomous communities. Although divided into chambers, it is roughly equivalent to a US
district court.
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Mejia holed up in his house and the secret police chief fled, while the ex-
Defense minister and the ex-Police Chief were held in a military hospital under
guard. This case represents the first time members of the military high command
were affected by any legal action against them, and one of a handful of cases
where any Guatemalan military officer has been subject to judicial proceedings.4
After over a year in detention, the defendants were freed when Guatemala's
Constitutional Court ("GCC") decided on December 12, 2007 that it would not
honor Spanish arrest warrants or extradition requests.' The court held that
Spanish courts did not constitute a "competent authority" because Spain did not
have jurisdiction over events that took place in Guatemala; the effort to exercise
universal jurisdiction was unacceptable and an affront to Guatemala's
sovereignty. The court added that the charges were related to political crimes
and thus not extraditable, and that Spain's participation in the 1980s Central
American peace process meant that it was bound by the commitments made by
the government and the insurgents that an official truth commission would have
no judicial effects. Given that commitment, the GCC concluded, it would be
inconsistent for Spain to now seek to prosecute crimes arising out of the
region's civil conflicts.
The problem of near-complete impunity for crimes committed during
periods of repression and internal armed conflict is not unique to Guatemala.
The powerful military and civilian figures who order such crimes usually retain a
large amount of power-dejure or de facto-even after the conflict ends or the
government changes and are singularly uninterested in criminal investigations
into the past. In contrast, the post-armed conflict state tends to be weak, with
limited resources and a culture of corruption and self-dealing among state
4 There have been two high-profile trials of military officers in the killings of Bishop Juan Gerardi
and anthropologist Myrna Mack. The Mack case, after over a dozen years, resulted in the
convictions of three officers, one of whom promptly went into hiding. The sentence is at
Recurso de Casaci6n Conexados 109-2003 and 110-2003 (Corte Suprema de Justicia, Jan 14,
2004), available online at <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/myrna/myrnacs.html>
(visited Apr 5, 2008). In the Gerardi case, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of two
officers in January 2006. See Conie Reynoso, Confirman sentenda: Contindapena de 20 aos de circel
para sindicados, Prensa Libre (Jan 14, 2006), available online at <http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/
p/2006/enero/14/132159.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008). For an excellent description of the
Gerardi case, see Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder Who Killed the Bishop? (Grove
2007). A handful of civil patrollers, members of paramilitary groups created and controlled by the
army, have also been convicted of murder in Guatemalan courts. But as detailed in this Article, by
and large the prosecutors' office has not pursued cases arising out of the armed conflict, and
judges have been intimidated, threatened, or bought off.
5 Sentencia del 12 de Diciembre de 2007, Corte de Constitucionalidad (Guatemala), Expediente
3380-2007, Audiencia Nacional de Espafia, available online at <http://www.cc.gob.gt/index-
2.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("GCC decision") (click "Ultimas Resoluciones" at the top of the
page for access to the decision).
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authorities. Moreover, in Guatemala as elsewhere, post-armed conflict military
and paramilitary networks have mutated into criminal networks, engaged in drug
running, human trafficking, and similar violent enterprises, with a degree of
impunity similar to that enjoyed by former military officials in human rights-
related cases.'
Much of the international institution-building over the last two decades in
the field of human rights and international humanitarian law has been aimed at
overcoming the impunity of powerful, untouchable actors. An emerging
international norm' holds that when large-scale humanitarian law violations have
been committed, action must be taken to deal with the past, including measures
to allow victims to find out what happened to their loved ones, to sanction those
responsible, and to provide redress. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") were built on the idea that only an international prosecution
and trial would have the ability and legitimacy to try high-ranking perpetrators,
including heads of state. Similarly, the International Criminal Court ("ICC") was
founded out of concern that states would be unwilling or unable to prosecute
powerful actors domestically, and that therefore a complementary forum was
needed. However, the experience of the ICTY and ICTR, while positive in many
ways, soon gave rise to criticism that the Tribunals were enormously expensive,
remote from the societies where the crimes took place, and did not help to
restore or create viable national justice systems.8
Hybrid tribunals, combining national and international law, procedure, and
personnel, seemed the appropriate response, and variants on such hybrid courts
were created in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo. In particular,
hybrid courts are theorized to be better at creating legitimacy and relevance for
local audiences, embedding international legal norms in national legal systems,
and training local lawyers and judges to use these norms and to carry out
complex criminal investigations, all at a lower cost than international tribunals.9
6 See Edgar Calderon, Capturan a ex militares, La Prensa (Nov 9, 2006), available online at
<http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2006/noviembre/09/noticias/internacionales/
155170.shtml> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
7 See, for example, UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc S/2004/616 Sec X (Aug 23, 2004);
see generally Louise Mallinder, Can Amnesties and International Justice be Reconciled?, 1 Intl J
Transitional Justice 208 (2007).
8 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Communiy in the Aftermath
of MassAtrocity (Cambridge 2004) (providing a detailed look at this problem).
9 See generally Laura Dickinson, Note, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 Am J Intl L 295 (2003);
Etelle Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform,
23 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 347 (2006).
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Initial evaluations of these courts showed varied results. While the Sierra Leone
Special Court was relatively successful in its outreach to the local society, on a
per case basis it was still quite expensive and the results vis-A-vis local legacy are
still unclear. 1° The other hybrids were seen, by and large, as less successful,
although in the Cambodia and Bosnia cases it is still too early for definitive
assessments." Still, even assuming unequivocal success, setting up hybrids is an
expensive and time-consuming proposition, and one unlikely to be used in many
situations where the government is unwilling to support it or the international
community does not provide adequate resources.
The Guatemalan case suggests another way to "hybridize" prosecutions in
the face of dysfunctional national justice systems and rampant impunity. With
respect to the security forces' high command, cases for genocide, torture,
massacres (extrajudicial killing), and enforced disappearance have been brought
simultaneously in national courts in Guatemala, Spain, and Belgium.'2 Victims'
groups have pursued a combined inside and outside legal strategy, pushing for
domestic prosecutions for genocide while also focusing on transnational
prosecution based on universal jurisdiction in other states' national courts. The
effort to obtain witness testimony and extradition of the defendants in the
transnational cases has led to considerable litigation in Guatemalan courts on
international law issues. At the same time, an agreement between the
Guatemalan government and the United Nations in 2006 created the
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala or Comisi6n
Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala ("CICIG"), which will look
into the workings of current clandestine groups and push for their investigation
and prosecution by local prosecutors in the local courts. Between them, these
efforts aim to impel the local prosecutors and courts into action against
impunity, with international support and oversight. 3
10 See Laura Dickinson, Remarks, Justice Should be Done, But Where? The Relationship Between National
and International Courts, 101 ASIL Proc 289, 297-99 (2007).
1 Id.
12 The Belgian cases involve the deaths of two Belgian priests-Serge Berten and Walter
Voordeckers--during the early 1980s, presumably at the hands of security forces. Family
members of the victims brought a case in Belgian courts in January 2001 under Belgium's then-
expansive universal jurisdiction law. The case remained open after the law was amended in 2003.
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human R'ghts ch 7
(Penn 2005).
13 A third strategy, also important in the Guatemalan context, involves the roles of the Inter-
American Commission on, and Court of, Human Rights in pushing for an end to impunity and
awarding redress to some victims. However, a full discussion of the role of the Inter-American
system is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information, see Due Process of Law
Foundation, Victims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Transitional Justice in Latin
Vol. 9 No. 1
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This Article will first briefly describe the background of the Guatemalan
conflict and the evolution of the transnational cases against the military high
command. It will then focus on some of the legal strategy issues involved and on
the gains and losses of this transnational networking approach to combating
impunity. In particular, it will look at how the multinational legal team, working
simultaneously in the Spanish and Guatemalan courts on different aspects of the
case, has allowed for learning and training opportunities for the lawyers
involved, has forced local courts to engage with international law, and has tried
to use the power of foreign courts to leverage domestic processes. It will
consider the content and impact of the Guatemalan and Spanish jurisprudence
generated by the case and its current prospects. It will then describe the mandate
and goals of CICIG and conclude with some initial thoughts on how these
initiatives might complement each other and serve as an example elsewhere.
I. THE CONTEXT AND THE PROCEEDINGS
Guatemala's internal armed conflict began in 1960 and ended officially in
1996. Over that period, according to the UN-sponsored Commission on
Historical Clarification ("CEH"), some 200,000 people were killed, over 90
percent of them by the military. Some 40,000 were the victims of enforced
disappearance.' 4 The bulk of the atrocities were committed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s; the vast majority of the victims were Mayan indigenous people who
were considered to be the support base for a guerrilla movement. The CEH
found that in at least four specific areas of the country, the army had committed
"acts of genocide." The CEH's rationale, adopted by complainants in the
genocide cases, was that
It is very important to distinguish between "the intent to destroy a group in
whole or in part", that is, the positive determination to do so, and the
motives of such an intent. In order to determine genocide, it is only
necessary to demonstrate that there exists an intent to destroy the group,
regardless of motive. For example, if the motive of the intent to destroy an
ethnic group is not a racist orientation but only a military objective, the
crime may nevertheless be understood to be genocide.'
5
America (2007), available online at <http://www.dplf.org/uploads/l190403828.pdf> (visited Apr
5, 2008).
14 CEH, 3 Guatemala: Memoria del Silendo, § 1252 (1999), available online in Spanish at
<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish/> (visited Apr 5, 2008). The summary and
recommendations, as well as a discussion of the genocide, are available in English at 108-23,
available online at <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/engflish/conc2.html> (visited Apr
5, 2008).
15 CEH, 3 Guatemala, § 855 (defining genocide as a series of acts, including killing and creating
conditions of life aimed at the physical destruction of victims, when committed with the "intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a racial, religious, national or ethnical group as such") (quoting the
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However, despite the fact that a 1996 amnesty law specifically excludes
genocide, forced disappearance, torture, and other international crimes from its
ambit, 16 no charges were ever filed against the organizers and planners of the
campaigns. To this day, less than a handful of cases arising out of the internal
armed conflict have ever been prosecuted, and most of those involve leaders of
the paramilitary militias (civil patrols) instituted by the army.
Given this panorama, in December 1999, Nobel Peace Prize winner
Rigoberta Mench6 and others brought a complaint in the Spanish Audiencia
Nacional 7 alleging genocide, torture, terrorism, summary execution, and
unlawful detention perpetrated against Guatemala's Mayan indigenous people
and their supporters during the 1970s and 1980s. The complainants' rationale
for the genocide charges included the targeting of Mayans as an ethnic group. It
was also based, following a gloss on the definition of genocide that the
Audiencia had accepted in earlier cases involving Chilean and Argentine
defendants, on the intended elimination of a part of the Guatemalan "national"
group due to its perceived ideology. 8 Among the events underlying the
complaint was the massacre of Menchti's father and thirty-five other people in
the 1980 firebombing of the Spanish embassy, the killing or disappearance of
four Spanish priests, and a large number of rural massacres, rapes, cases of
torture, and enforced disappearance. The complainants grounded Spanish
jurisdiction on Article 23.4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch
("LOPJ").' 9 That provision allows for prosecution of certain crimes committed
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), art II, 78 UN
Treaty Ser 277 (1951)).
16 Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional, Decreto No 145-1996, art 8 (Dec 27, 1996), available online at
<www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/0148.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
17 See explanation in note 3.
18 See Auto de la sala de lo penal de la Audiencia Naional confirmando lajurisdicidn de Espaiiapara conocer de
los crimenes de genoddioy terrorismo cometido durante la dictadura Agentina (Decision (Auto) of the Full Penal
Chamber Confirming Spanish Jurisdiction Over the Crimes of Genodde and Terrorism Committed During the
Argentine Dictatorship), Appeal No 84-98, 3d Section, File 19/97 from Judicial Chamber 5, Autos
(Audiencia Nacional, Nov 4, 1998) (Spain), available online at <http://www.derechos.org/
nizkor/arg/espana/audi.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (author translation); Auto de la sala de lopenal
de la Audienda Naional confirmando la jurisdicidn de Espaiia para conocer de los crimenes de genociio y
terrorismo cometido durante la dictadura Chilena (Decision (Auto) of the Full Penal Chamber Confirming
Spanish Jurisdiction Over the Crimes of Genocide and Terrorism Committed During the Chilean Dictatorshi),
Appeal No 173-98, 1st Section, File 1/98 from Judicial Chamber 6 (Audiencia Nacional, Nov 5,
1998) (Spain), available online at <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/audi.html>
(visited Apr 5, 2008) (author translation). See also the English translation of the decision
regarding Chile in Reed Brody and Michael Ramer, eds, The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto
Pinochet in Spain and Britain (Kluwer 2000).
19 Ley Org-nica 6/1985, BOE 1985, 157, available online at <http://noticias.juridicas.com/
base datos/Admin/lo6-1985.lltl.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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by non-Spaniards outside Spain, including genocide, terrorism, and other crimes
recognized in international treaties ratified by Spain. On March 27, 2000,
Investigating Judge Guillermo Rufz Polanco of the Audiencia Nacional accepted
the Guatemalan complaint and agreed to open an investigation.20 In reaching
that decision, the judge noted that several of the victims were Spanish and that
the Guatemalan courts had failed to investigate the crimes.
21
The Spanish Public Prosecutors' Office, at the time in the hands of the
conservative Popular Party, appealed the judge's jurisdiction. An appeals panel
of the Audiencia Nacional, and then the Spanish Supreme Court, found that the
Spanish courts had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held, by a vote of 8-7,
that customary international law required a link to the forum state when
universal jurisdiction was not grounded in specific treaty provisions or
authorized by the United Nations.23 Thus, only those cases that involved Spanish
citizens could proceed. In September 2005, Spain's highest tribunal, the
Constitutional Tribunal, reversed.24 The Tribunal began with the plain language
and legislative intent of Article 23.4 of the LOPJ. As the Constitutional Tribunal
pointed out, the law itself establishes only a single limitation: the suspect cannot
have been convicted, found innocent, or pardoned abroad. It contains no
implicit or explicit hierarchy of potential jurisdictions and focuses only on the
nature of the crime, not on any ties to the forum; it establishes concurrent
jurisdiction. Given the absence of textual support for a restrictive interpretation
of the law, such a construction would be overly strict and unwarranted given the
grave nature of the crimes. The Tribunal re-opened the case for all
complainants, including large numbers of Guatemalans who were survivors or
family members of massacre victims.2 The full case, focusing on genocide, could
then go forward.
20 Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n No 1, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, Dil Previas 331/99, Auto de
27 de Marzo de 2000 (on file with author).
21 Id.
22 See Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect at ch 1 (cited in note 12). The Public Prosecutors' Office
dropped its opposition to this and other universal jurisdiction cases when the Socialist Party
assumed office. See Amnistia Internacional, La Audienda National condena al ex militar argentino
Adofo Scilingo par rmenes de lesa humanidad (Apr 19, 2005), available online at
<http://ania.urcm.net/ noticia.php3?id=13324&idcat=l&idamb=3> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
23 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Guatemala por genocidio, Sentencia No 327/2003, Appeal
Roll 115/2000, Case 331/99, File 162/2000 (Tribunal Supremo, Second Penal Chamber Feb 25,
2003) (Spain), available online at <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/
gtmsent.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
24 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 Am J Intl L 207, 207 (2006).
25 Id at 211.
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The next step in the re-opened case, which was assigned to Judge Santiago
Pedraz, was to take the statements of the suspects, a procedure designed to
allow defendants to tell their side of the story before any arrest warrants issued.
Judge Pedraz, following long-established rules for taking statements in another
state through a rogatory commission, worked through a Guatemalan judge to set
up the dates, and the judge, along with the Spanish prosecutor, traveled to
Guatemala. The defendants apparently did not see much advantage to telling
their side of the story; they filed extraordinary writs of amparo before the local
courts claiming their appearance would violate their constitutional rights. In
most Latin American countries, the ability to challenge government action in
violation of constitutional rights, known as amparo, is a cornerstone of individual
rights, and the defendants made constant use of the procedure from this point
on." At this time as well, the Center for Justice and Accountability ("CJA"), a
US-based NGO that had experience litigating transnational cases through its
work using the US Alien Tort Statute,27 came into the case representing several
families of victims. CJA and its international attorney Almudena Bernabeu
would soon put together and lead an international legal team for this new phase
of the case.
Fortunately, despite the inability to take formal statements, Judge Pedraz
did not leave Guatemala entirely empty-handed. He met informally with several
representatives of victims organizations who told their stories and detailed the
lack of justice in the local courts. In particular, they told the judge that an
association of survivors, the Association for Justice and Reconciliation ("AJR"),
had been trying to get the local prosecutors' office to investigate the same set of
defendants since 2000, but that aside from a few early depositions of other
retired military officers, nothing had been done.28 Guatemala, like most countries
in Latin America, changed its criminal procedure during the 1990s to make it
more prosecutor-driven; only the prosecutors' office (Ministerio Ptiblico) rather
than victims or judges could press forward with an investigation. And despite
26 See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Some Aspects of the 'Amparo" Proceeding in Latin America as a Constitutional
Judicial Mean Speificaly Established for the Protection of Human Rights, Colloquium in International and
Comparative Law, U Maryland School of Law (Oct 2007), available online at
<http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1001&context=iclc_
papers> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
27 28 USC § 1350 (2006). The statute allows for civil suits in US federal court by aliens for torts in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the US.
28 The AJR case was brought by a Guatemalan human rights group, the Center for Legal Action for
Human Rights, in two phases: in 2000 against officials of the Lucas Garcia regime and in 2001
against those of the subsequent Rios Montt regime. Case No. 3920-2000, Ministerio Pdiblico,
Guatemala (on file with author). Although the complaints are unpublished, information (in
Spanish) on them is available online at <http://www.caldh.org> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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millions in international aid, training, and support,29 the prosecutors' office
remained ineffective, disrespectful to victims, and vulnerable to threats and
corruption, and was reportedly infiltrated by military intelligence and criminal
networks of various sorts.'
In any event, Judge Pedraz returned to Spain, and a month later, on July 7,
2006 issued charges and international arrest warrants for the defendants on
charges of genocide, state terrorism, torture, and related crimes.3' In early
November, Guatemala's Fifth Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and
Environmental Offenses (the local trial court) executed four of the six arrest
warrants. Two others were rejected for technical reasons.32 Although the
technical problems were cleared up soon after, those warrants have never been
executed.33 One of them was for General Rios Montt, the former head of state
from 1982-83, who by that time was running for Congress, and the other for
General Benedicto Lucas, former army chief of staff from 1978-80. The four
defendants reacted differently: one fled, one holed up in his house, one was in a
military hospital and was put under guard, and the other turned himself in and
29 See, for example, UNDP, Proyecto defortalecimiento del MP (Project for Strengthening the Public Prosecutor),
available online at <http://www.pnudguatemala.org/seguridadjusticia/
gua0008.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008); World Bank Group, Guatemala Judicdal Reform Project,
available online at <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/45bla64b68f7a2d3852
567d6006c364a/8eb97ef168cccbe4852567e8007bb8be?OpenDocument> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
30 Susan Peacock and Adriana Beltrin, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala: Illegal Armed Groups
and the Forces behind Them 43, 44 (Washington Office on Latin America, Sept 2003), available online
at <http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/HiddenPowersFul.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008). According to
the US State Department Country Report for 2006:
While the constitution and the law provide for an independent judiciary, the
judicial system often failed to provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency,
corruption, insufficient personnel and funds, and intimidation of judges,
prosecutors, and witnesses. The majority of serious crimes were not
investigated or punished. Many high-profile criminal cases remained pending in
the courts for long periods as defense attorneys employed successive appeals
and motions.
US Department of State, Country Reports on Human R'ghts Practices: Guatemala 2006, § I.e (2007),
available online at <http://www.state.gov/ g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78893.htm> (visited Apr 5,
2008).
31 See note 2.
32 Guatemala does not typically publish lower court pretrial decisions, hence no published record of
these rejections is available. (Reference documents on file with author.)
33 The warrants were initially rejected because of a clerical error; the ones that reached Guatemala
included only the allegations surrounding the 1980 Spanish Embassy massacre, not the genocide
charges stemming from the entire 1979-85 period. New, corrected arrest orders were sent
immediately, but by that time the case was suspended due to the first of many amparos. The lower
court judges then left them pending until the legal issues around the executed warrants could be
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also ended up in a military hospital. They all, however, hired lawyers in
Guatemala to contest the extraditions.
On November 22, Judge Pedraz followed up with formal extradition
requests.34 He cited an 1895 Extradition Treaty between Guatemala and Spain
and explained in detail why each article of the Treaty applied in this case. He also
discussed the crime of genocide and attached a copy of the 2005 Spanish
Constitutional Court decision to show that he had jurisdiction under Spanish
law.
35
II. THE PARALLEL ADVANTAGES OF HYBRID TRIBUNALS AND
TRANSNATIONAL PROSECUTIONS
The effort to use Spanish courts to bring high-ranking Guatemalan security
force officers to justice, especially from 2006 on, exemplifies how, in many ways,
transnational litigation shares some of the advantages of litigation in hybrid
tribunals. In particular, both emphasize creating new movement within domestic
legal systems and lowering costs. In other aspects, however, especially the ability
to execute arrest warrants, the litigation has shared the disadvantages of other
forms of international criminal prosecution.
A. TRAINING LOCAL LAWYERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMPLEX CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
One of the often-mentioned benefits of hybrid tribunals is their ability to
impact local jurisprudence and train local staff, both lawyers and judges. By
creating mixed national-international judicial panels and mixed professional
staffs, hybrid courts combine the expertise and legitimacy of international judges
and staff with the knowledge of local law and legal culture and the long-term
commitment to the country of national personnel. International investigations
and prosecutions provide on-the-job training for national lawyers in
international law and complex criminal cases.36 They also, at least in theory, help
imbue newly reformed or (re)created justice systems with the ethics and spirit of
the rule of law. In practice, that theoretical promise has not always materialized.
Critics have pointed out that most of the substantive legal jobs may well, under
time constraints, go to outsiders, that the judges are not necessarily qualified in
34 Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n No. 1, Dil Previas 331/99, Auto de 22 Noviembre 2006 (on file
with author).
35 Id.
36 See, for example, Dickinson, Hybrid Courts at 307 (cited in note 9).
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international law nor willing or able to impart whatever expertise they have to
local counterparts, and that links to the local bar may be tenuous at best.
37
Compared to the creation of hybrid institutions, transnational prosecutions
can also provide advantages, including some of the same training and norm
diffusion benefits. Early transnational prosecutions involving international
crimes like genocide, torture, and other crimes against humanity often
incorporated exiled lawyers from the state where the atrocities took place.
National human rights and legal groups served more as information sources,
witness-seekers, and media channels, while the litigation team was based largely
abroad. This distinction was true, for instance, of the earlier cases in the Spanish
courts against the high command of the Argentine and Chilean militaries for
their crimes during the 1970s."8 Subsequent cases, including the ongoing effort
to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissene Habr6 in Senegal and Belgium
39
and the attempt to prosecute high-ranking US officials in German courts,4°
involved the creation of complex multinational legal teams. The Guatemala case
followed and elaborated on this approach.
In the Guatemalan case, Rigoberta Mench6i had been initially represented
in Spain by labor and criminal lawyers who focused on the validity of Spain's
jurisdiction. Once the genocide case was re-opened, and after the judge's visit to
Guatemala in June 2006, a new legal team led by the CJA began working with
lawyers in Menchd's local foundation offices in Guatemala to develop the
evidence for the Spanish case. At the same time, the team began dealing with the
extradition and rogatory commission cases in the Guatemalan courts. Eventually
the legal team grew to include local counsel in Spain with experience litigating
universal jurisdiction cases, lawyers in the Hague and San Francisco with
knowledge of both international and national criminal law, law students at the
University of California-Hastings and Harvard human rights legal clinics, and the
Menchdi Foundation lawyers in Guatemala (who were coordinating with other
legal human rights groups there).
These international and national lawyers have strategized and worked
together on pleadings before both the Spanish and Guatemalan courts and, most
37 See, for example, Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts at 368-69 (cited in note 9).
38 For a narrative of those cases, see generally Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect (cited in note 12).
39 The International Committee for the Trial of Hissene Habr6 included Human Rights Watch
Special Counsel Reed Brody and human rights groups and lawyers from Chad, Senegal, the UK,
and France. See Reed Brody, The Prosecution ofHissene Habri" An 'Afi'can Pinochet," 35 New Eng L
Rev 321, 324 (2001).
40 See Center for Constitutional Rights, German War Crimes Complaint against Donald Rum~feld, et al,
available online at <http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-war-crimes-complaint-
against-donald-rumsfeld%2C-et-al.> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (describing the case brought against
Donald Rumsfeld and others for torture in Abu Ghraib).
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recently, before international human rights bodies. There have been advantages
to this approach: rather than a (potentially paternalistic) one-way transmission of
knowledge from the international lawyers to the local ones, there has been a
partnership wherein both sides learn. The international lawyers have had to
grapple with how to present international law arguments in the (rather
Byzantine, at least by US standards) Guatemalan legal system, while the national
lawyers get the experience and access to non-Spanish language research materials
of the internationals. Interestingly, prior experience with civil Alien Tort cases in
the US has proven particularly useful in thinking about how to protect witnesses
from retraumatization, give complainants an active protagonistic role in the
proceedings and in witness preparation, selection, and presentation. When it
came time to present witnesses before the Spanish judge, for example, the judge
accepted that witnesses be asked specific questions by their lawyers, a style of
deposition more familiar to US trial lawyers than to the traditionally less oral,
less structured style of Spanish pretrial procedure.
Working with witnesses has also opened the way for incorporating new,
young Guatemalan lawyers into complex criminal cases. Once the case began
moving forward in Spain, the legal team laid out a strategy for proving genocide.
Building on the findings of the CEH, they put together witness lists involving
people from the hardest-hit areas and people who could testify about different
aspects of genocide: massacres, bombings, forced displacement, destruction of
community structures, and targeting of local religious and secular authorities.
The team also added new complainants who were survivors and eyewitnesses to
massacres. Most of the attorneys working with these witnesses to accompany
them to give testimony before the Spanish court have been young Mayan
women who can communicate with the witnesses in the witnesses' own language
(which is generally not Spanish). These young lawyers will return to Guatemala
with exposure to methods of investigation, witness preparation, and criminal
procedure that will inform their work at home. Through this joint work, these
cases begin to build up a cohort of international human rights lawyers equally at
home in their national systems and with international law and with enough
knowledge of foreign legal systems to be able to conceive of multilayered
strategies that move from the national to the international and back.
B. MAKING LOCAL COURTS ENGAGE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A related advantage of hybrid courts is their ability to foster local
ownership of justice processes. By combining national and international law and
personnel, such courts may foster the (re)construction of a viable domestic legal
system which may act as a source of justice rather than of oppression or
corruption. Hybrid courts may be able to reflect local culture, language, and law
Vo. 9 No. 1
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while remaining anchored to the core values of international human rights and
humanitarian law.4 Because proceedings take place locally, the affected
population and the press can observe them. On the other hand, hybrids, like
national courts generally, are for these same reasons no doubt more vulnerable
to threats, political influence, and corruption than their purely international
counterparts.42
Transnational investigation and prosecution can in theory penetrate
national legal systems in ways similar to those posited for hybrid courts, but they
are also subject to limitations. A case in point is the intense judicial activity
surrounding Judge Pedraz's 2006 arrest orders and extradition requests. These
orders and requests set off a furious battle in the Guatemalan courts. The local
courts had to decide whether to execute the arrest warrants, whether to grant
extradition,43 and how to deal with requests for judicial cooperation involving
witnesses, defendants, documents, and assets. Along the way, the local courts
had to grapple with complex arguments about the propriety of universal
jurisdiction, the nature of international crimes, and the role of international law
in Guatemala's constitutional order. Each of these involved a combination of
local and international law.
In general, the rules on extradition are designed to deal with common
crimes, not international crimes like genocide. Most extradition treaties,
including the Spain-Guatemala Treaty,' have a similar set of rules. The alleged
acts must be criminalized in both legal systems, and the requested state must
only satisfy itself that the requesting state has jurisdiction under its own laws and
has made out the rough equivalent of probable cause; a full evidentiary showing
is not required. Political crimes, and common crimes connected to them, are not
subject to extradition; however, the treaty does not define what constitutes a
political crime. Also like many extradition treaties, the Spain-Guatemala Treaty
41 See, for example, Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts at 411 (cited in note 9).
42 See, for example, Justice Initiative, Securioy Council Must Address Costs of Moving Taylor Trial to the
Hague (Apr 4, 2006), available online at <http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=
103165> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (reviewing the debates around removing the Charles Taylor trial in
the Sierra Leone Special Court to the Hague due to security concerns in West Africa); Justice
Initiative, Corruption Allegations at Khmer Rouge Court Must Be Investigated Thoroughy (Feb 14, 2007),
available online at <http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?resid=103627> (visited Apr
5, 2008) (providing an example of concerns about the lack of independence of the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers).
43 Even if the courts allowed the extraditions to proceed, the Executive Branch would still have a
chance to stop them at a later point. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, El
procedimiento de extradicidn en Guatemala 6-7, available online at <http://www.oas.org/
juridico/MLA/sp/gtm/spgtm-ext-gen-procedure.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
44 Tratado de Extradici6n entre Espafia y Guatemala, (Nov 7, 1895) and Protocolo Adicional
aclarando su articulo VII (Feb 23, 1897).
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does not require (but does allow) the extradition of nationals.45 Guatemala's
Constitution also contains a prohibition on the extradition of nationals, but its
Article 27 has an exception that seems tailor-made for this case: it excludes
alleged crimes contained in "treaties and conventions with respect to crimes
against humanity or against international law."46
Even though the arrest orders came from a Spanish court, they would have
to be enforced through Guatemalan courts ordering the police to execute the
warrants. Extradition proceedings had the immense advantage of bypassing the
public prosecutors' office, which had long held up domestic proceedings and
was not considered particularly eager to move any of the armed conflict or
genocide cases along given their political sensitivity and complexity. If the courts
moved towards extradition, at the very least, that might embarrass the
prosecutors' office into action. Indeed, in July 2007 the prosecutors' office
began threatening to call witnesses in the Spanish Embassy massacre case of
1980, in what seemed to be a feeble attempt to preempt the Spanish proceedings
by showing they were prosecuting the case at home. This response vindicated
the complainants' legal strategy: by pushing for prosecution abroad, they could
prod the courts into acting at home, even if the prosecutor's actual motivation
was to undermine the foreign proceedings.4"
The defendants immediately filed writs of amparo complaining that their
constitutional rights had been violated by the local court's execution of the arrest
warrants.48 The defendants argued, among other things, that the Spanish courts
were not a "competent authority" to issue an arrest warrant and could not
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction because Guatemalan sovereignty forbade it.
They further argued that the language of the extradition treaty referred to those
who had "taken refuge" in Guatemala, and that as Guatemalan citizens therefore
they were not covered by the treaty, that the alleged crimes were not covered by
the treaty, and that the treaty was too old and outdated to be effective. The trial
49court rejected these arguments and found that Spanish jurisdiction was proper.
That decision was appealed, but the appeals court sent the case back to the
lower court.50 The trial court again found jurisdiction, and the appeals court, in
45 Id, art V.
46 Guatemala Const, art 27 (1985, amend 1993), available online at <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Constitu ions/Guate/guate93.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (author translation).
47 For a fuller explanation of how this insider/outsider theory has worked in the case of Spanish
investigations into military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, see Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect
at chs 7-8 (cited in note 12).
48 For a description of amparo, see text accompanying note 26.
49 Resoluci6n, Tribunal Quinto, No 2-2006 (Mar 28, 2007) (on file with author).
50 Resoluci6n, Sala Primera de Apelaciones, No 2-2006 (June 1, 2007) (on file with author).
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October 2007, agreed.5' The court recognized that the extradition treaty was
binding, that Spanish jurisdiction was proper, and that the crimes at issue were
of "grave importance" under international law and thus subject to extradition
even though they were not-and could not have been in 1897-listed as
extraditable crimes in the treaty. The trial court also fined the defendants'
lawyers for filing frivolous appeals.
52
The defendants, throughout the process, filed challenge after challenge,
some of them almost exact repetitions of earlier ones. The defendants' repeated
challenges suspended the proceedings over and over again, to the immense
frustration of the complainants. No one begrudged the defendants a legitimate
right to defense, but as their lawyers refiled arguments that had already been
rejected over and over, it became clear that here, as in other criminal cases
involving powerful defendants,53 the writ of amparo had become a mechanism
for delay and abuse.
As soon as the arrest warrants were announced, three complainants in the
Spanish case-Rigoberta Mench6, Jesis Tec6, and Juan Manuel Ger6nimo-
asked for and were admitted to the case as intervenors (terceros interesados). Yet
despite their intervenor status, they were continually denied access to the file,
notification of hearings, and copies of relevant documents. By August 2007, they
were frustrated and decided to file their own amparo alleging violations of their
rights as victims of human rights violations. Advised by the international legal
team, they cited the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court
on the right to the truth, the right to information, the right to prompt and
effective justice without excessive delay, and the right to an independent
tribunal.54 Shortly thereafter, the trial court agreed with them and ordered the
51 The trial court found jurisdiction for a second time on July 31, 2007, and the appeals court agreed
on October 26, 2007. Sala Primera de la Corte de Apelaciones, Amparo 87-2006/543-2006,
Sentencia Oct 26, 2007 (on file with author).
52 Id.
53 The use of abusive amparos was documented, for example, in the Myrna Mack case, one of the few
cases in which the Guatemalan courts convicted military officers of killing. See Fundaci6n Myrna
Mack, Caso Myrna Mack, resumen de las audiencias ante el Tribunal Tercero de Sentenda del 3 de Sepliembre
al 3 de Octubre de 2002, available online at <http://www.myrnamack.org.gt/main.php?idarea
=33> (visited Apr 5, 2008). Guatemala does not typically publish lower court pretrial decisions,
hence there is no public record of these amparos. A bill has been pending in the Guatemalan
Congress to reform the amparo procedure, but it has apparently not progressed very far.
54 See, for example, Consultative Opinion OC 9-87 of Oct. 6, 1987 on Judicial Guarantees in States
of Emergency, art 27(2), 25 and 8, 24, available online at <http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/bll_4i.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008); see also Blake case, Reparations Judgment
(Jan. 22, 1999) Ser C; Resolutions and Sentences, 61, 63, available online at
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/48-ing.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008). The
complainants also cited, as persuasive authority, cases of the Colombian Supreme Court that
balanced defendants' due process rights against victims' rights to truth and access to justice. Corte
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case file released. The release was suspended when the defendants filed-yet
another-writ of amparo. Nonetheless, the offensive (rather than defensive) use
of the amparo proceeding to claim rights as victims under international law to
limit the abusive use of dilatory motions is an innovation in Guatemala. While
the use of dilatory writs will, in the end, be curbed only by either legislation or a
change in attitude of the higher courts, at least it established a precedent that
victims do indeed have internationally recognized rights that must be given
effect in local courts.
Through this complicated set of domestic proceedings, triggered by an
international warrant, trial-level Guatemalan courts had to grapple with
international law and to compare their procedures and ways of thinking with the
jurisprudence generated by international courts as well as other Latin American
courts facing similar issues. Through the offensive use of the amparo writ,
international law-in this instance concerning the rights of victims-was
brought into an area of domestic law where international law had not previously
been applied. In this way, transnational prosecutions allow local courts to
become familiar with international law and to modernize and innovate, while
remaining grounded in local legal culture and practice.
III. LIMITS TO EFFECTIVENESS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT DECISION OF DECEMBER 2007 AND THE
SPANISH JUDGE'S RESPONSE
On December 12, 2007, the GCC ruled that the Spanish arrest warrants
were invalid and that defendants could not be extradited."5 The sixty-plus page
ruling responded to yet another amparp, lodged by Guevara and Arredondo,
against the constitutionality of the arrest warrants issued in November 2006. The
amparo questions only the validity of the arrest warrants, yet the GCC looked
beyond that question to consider the validity of the entire extradition
proceeding. The ruling began by accepting that the 1895 extradition treaty
between Spain and Guatemala is still valid, but found that it must be interpreted
in light of the drafters' intentions. Nothing in the treaty explicitly refers to
extraterritorial jurisdiction, they noted, and the fact that the treaty speaks of
those seeking asylum or refuge in another state indicates that the drafters were
thinking about nationals of another state hiding in the requested state.56 The
Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C-004/03, Demanda de Inconstitucionalidad (Jan 20,
2003), available online at <http://www.cajpe.org.pe/rij/bases/juris-nac/c-004.PDF> (visited
Apr 5, 2008).
55 See GCC decision (cited in note 5).
56 See id at 15-17 (cited in note 5). This method of interpreting the treaty is at odds with the method
of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), 1155 UN
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treaty, they argued, must be read in light of the territorial principle of the
criminal law. Therefore, they concluded, the treaty does not apply to crimes
committed within Guatemala.
The GCC added that it could look into Spanish law because it needed to
convince itself that the courts of the requesting country are a "competent
authority" under the Extradition Treaty.57 Although from 2005 on Spain clearly
had jurisdiction under Spanish law, the GCC asks whether the 2005 Spanish
Constitutional Court decision that allowed re-opening of the full investigation,
comports with international law.
It concludes that universal jurisdiction cannot be maintained because it
affronts Guatemalan sovereignty. While Guatemala might recognize an
international tribunal, the GCC stated, it will not recognize the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of another national court. Otherwise, it argued, one state would be
judging another state's ability or willingness to prosecute without either Security
Council or General Assembly approval. This line of reasoning is highly
problematic, as it is in practice an action of judicial review of the decisions of
foreign courts. In effect, the Guatemalan court disagrees with the Spanish
court's interpretation of Spanish law. In addition, the GCC finds that extradition
is improper for other reasons: both Spain and Guatemala prohibit the
extradition of nationals. However, this is not strictly speaking true: Article 27 of
Guatemala's constitution allows the extradition of nationals where the crimes are
based on treaties and conventions with respect to crimes against humanity or
against international law.58 The GCC reads this reference, though, as limited to
surrender to international courts like the ICC, the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, or even the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (which has no
criminal jurisdiction).
In dicta, the GCC finds that the crimes alleged are common crimes
connected to political crimes because they are connected to the armed conflict,
and that the Constitution holds that citizens cannot be extradited for political
crimes.5 9 This is legally incorrect: the Genocide Convention's Article VII
specifically states that "genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III
Treaty Ser 331, art 31, available online at <http://www.oas.org/DIL/ViennaConventon_
on the_ Law_ofTreaties.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
57 See Tratado de Extradici6n and Protocolo Adicional aclarando su articulo VII (cited in note 44).
58 Guatemala Const, art 27 (cited in note 46). The Court adds that extradition of nationals is also
improper because there is no reciprocity, but this is also not strictly speaking true; where a treaty
requires it, Spain will extradite its nationals. Art 1, Ley 4/1985, de 21 de Marzo, de Extradici6n
Pasiva, available online at <http://noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/Penal/14-1985.html>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
59 GCC decision at 22-23, 54 (cited in note 5).
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shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition."6 ° The
GCC may have been signaling that it would consider these crimes in any
domestic prosecution as subject to the Guatemalan Law of National
Reconciliation, which grants limited amnesty to persons who have committed
political crimes and common crimes connected to them. 6' But Articles 4 and 8
of that law specifically exclude the type of crime alleged in the Spanish request.
62
Along the same lines, the Court characterizes the context of the case as a region-
wide civil conflict over political and economic models, with external support on
both sides and which pitted ethnic and indigenous people against each other. By
so labeling the conflict, the Court implicitly rejects the charge of genocide.63
Finally, the Court recognizes the obligation of the Guatemalan courts to
investigate and prosecute under the principle of aut dedere autjudicare (extradite or
prosecute) if extradition is denied and invites the complainants to submit their
evidence to the Public Prosecutor. This is a bit disingenuous, since the judges
know perfectly well that charges on these crimes have long been filed with the
prosecutor and have gone nowhere. However, the GCC's recognition that the
domestic system needs to prosecute is important. Now they need to follow
through.
As a result, the Court finds that the suspects' constitutional rights have
been violated and orders the arrest warrants quashed. While technically the
judgment should only apply to the two defendants who appealed, they make it
extensive to all the other suspects as third-party intervenors. There can be no
appeal from the decision.
The GCC's decision is clearly a setback for the complainants and for
international law. It exemplifies some of the limits of a transnational litigation
strategy. In a climate of intimidation where judges are routinely bribed or
threatened into submission, where the legal system has been repeatedly criticized
for its ineffectiveness and for allowing rampant impunity, and where some (but
60 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art VII (cited in note
15). See also Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994), art V, 33
ILM 1529 ("The forced disappearance of persons shall not be considered a political offense for
purposes of extradition."). The UN and Inter-American Torture Conventions also require that
torture be considered an extraditable offense. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), General Assembly Res No 39/46, UN
Doc A/39/51, art 8(1) (1987) (stating that torture must be extraditable offense). See also Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), OAS Treaty Ser No 67, art 13
(1987).
61 Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional (cited in note 16).
62 Id, arts 4, 8.
63 GCC at 50 (cited in note 5).
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not all) of the defendants still hold power,' the defensive tone and negative
outcome of the case may have been inevitable. The willingness of the lower
courts to go forward, the obvious errors and omissions of the GCC's judgment,
and even the length of time it took for the GCC to rule on the arrest warrants
despite several earlier opportunities to do so, are reasons for hope that there are
some cracks in the faqade of impunity. After all, early cases in the Chilean and
Argentine courts also featured more open lower courts, followed by
conservative decisions rejecting international human rights law obligations at the
highest levels.6" Both the Chilean Supreme Court and the Argentine Supreme
Court have now invalidated or limited amnesty laws and approved prosecutions
for past crimes based in part on international law obligations.
The Achilles heel of all international justice efforts, whether at the ICC,
through hybrid courts, or through transnational prosecutions, is the inability to
execute arrest warrants against powerful defendants. The ICC, for example, has
been hamstrung by the inability to apprehend indicted Sudanese officials accused
of crimes against humanity in Darfur, despite the existence of a Security Council
referral and numerous resolutions condemning those crimes. 6 The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia became effective only when
NATO troops began to seek out and arrest suspects. 6' Hybrid tribunals,
although theoretically less exposed to this problem because they have the
cooperation of the territorial government, have still experienced difficulties:
Charles Taylor for many years could not be extradited from Nigeria to the Sierra
64 Efrain Rios Montt, for example, was elected to Congress in 2007, in part as a stated attempt to
gain immunity from prosecution. As a Congressman, he has immunity for criminal acts
committed while in office, but that immunity does not preclude investigation by the Spanish
courts. See Ex-Dictador Rios Montt vuelve al Congreso, La Prensa (Sept 11, 2007), available online at
<http://laprensa.aplyca.com/ediciones/2007/09/11 /ex-dictadortios montt vuelve al_
congreso> (visited Apr 5 2008); Inds Benitez, Ex-Dictator on Rocky Road to Congress-and Immuniy,
IPS (May 23, 2007), available online at <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37871> (visited
Apr 5, 2008). As to the other defendants, one strategic consideration here is that they may have
less current ability to influence outcomes or to threaten participants than other, lower-ranked
former officers who may be more active in current criminal and intelligence networks.
65 For description and analysis, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Lauren Gibson, The Developing
Jurisprudence onAmnesoy, 20 Hum Rts Q 843 (1998).
66 UN News Centre, UN War Crimes Prosecutor Calls for Arrest of First Dafur Suspects (june 7, 2007),
available online at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=22826&Cr=sudan&
Crl=> (visited Apr 5, 2008); Security Council Res No 1593, UN Doc S/Res/1593/2005 (Mar31,
2005).
67 The two most wanted suspects at the ICTY are still at large, and NATO has been criticized for its
inaction. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Balkans: Srebrenica's Most Wanted Remain Free
(June 29, 2005), available online at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228-
txt.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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Leone Special Court.68 The Special Panels on Serious Crimes in East Timor were
similarly unable to prosecute members of Indonesia's high command for
atrocities in East Timor because Indonesia refused to extradite them.69
Transnational prosecutions will suffer from the same weakness when the
defendant's presence is sought through extradition: unless he leaves his country
and travels to a third state willing to execute the arrest warrants, the defendant
will be beyond the reach of the foreign court.
IV. AFTERMATH AND CURRENT PROSPECTS
Reaction to the GCC decision was not long in coming. International
human rights groups uniformly criticized the holding and the reasoning.
European civil society groups began pressuring their governments and EU
institutions to question the Guatemalan government's commitment to human
rights,70 a particularly sensitive point given the installation of a new government
in January 2008 as well as ongoing negotiations for an EU-Central American
Association Agreement.7' Above all, human rights and humanitarian lawyers
pointed out that if Guatemala was not going to extradite the suspects, it had an
international legal obligation to try them at home. That obligation was explicit
under the UN and Inter-American Conventions Against Torture and Enforced
Disappearances as well as the Genocide Convention.7 2 It was also, quite
obviously, not being fulfilled.
68 Liberia Seeks End to Taylor Exile, BBC News (Mar 17, 2006), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/africa/4817106.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
69 David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Modelfor the Future?, 61
Asia Pac Issues 1 (East-West Center, Aug 2002), available online at
<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api61.pdf > (visited Apr 5, 2008).
70 See, for example, CIFCA (Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico), Urgente:
Guatemala anula elproceso de Eparia contra los militares acusados de genoddio (Jan 15, 2008), available
online at <http://www.cifca.org/Decision%20CC,%/20a%20COLAT,/ 20%2Dic/ 2007.pdf>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
71 The EU and the Central American countries are engaged in negotiation of a comprehensive
Association Agreement, which is to include both political and economic components including a
free trade agreement. As part of those negotiations, on December 15, 2003, the parties concluded
an EU-Central America Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, which states in article
1(1): "Respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as for the principle of the rule of law, underpins
the internal and international policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of this
Agreement." CE/AM-CENTR/en/1, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/extemal-
relations/ca/pol/pdca_12_03_en.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008). For information on the negotiation
process and goals, see The EU's Relations with Central America: Overview, available online at
<http://ec.europa.eu/external-relations/ca/index.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
72 Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional, arts 4, 8 (cited in note 16).
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Most spectacularly, Spanish Judge Pedraz also responded to the GCC
decision. On January 9, 2008, he issued his own ruling condemning Guatemala's
lack of cooperation and abandonment of its responsibilities under international
law.73 In strong language, the judge complained about the complete lack of
collaboration on his requests for rogatory commissions and lambasted the GCC
decision as ignoring Guatemala's conventional and customary law obligations to
extradite or to prosecute, which the judge traced back as far as Grotius, as well
as the extradition treaty. 4
Judge Pedraz also recalled that genocide is a crime in international law that
cannot be labeled a political offense and found that Guatemala was also violating
an international treaty and customary law obligation to prevent and to punish
the crime of genocide against the Mayan people. He concluded:
This resolution of the Constitutional Court, issued by the maximal judicial
authority, in light of the above-referenced facts and of the advanced age of
the accused, together with the well-known fact that the level of impunity for
lesser crimes in Guatemala is among the world's highest, confirms the
State's intention not to investigate these crimes and bring those responsible
before the courts. This gives clear backing to impunity, ignoring the above-
referenced international law and, therefore, placing Guatemala in the sphere
of countries that violate their international obligations and disdain the
defense of human rights.75
Nonetheless, the judge wrote, the GCC decision showed the continued
need for Spanish judicial authorities to investigate the alleged crimes. However,
he would no longer rely on the Guatemalan courts but would bring witnesses to
Spain to testify.76 In addition, he called on anyone-victims, witnesses, or
others-having information about the case to bring it directly to him through
the proper channels.77 He thus opened up new possibilities for evidence
gathering by victims' groups, complainants' lawyers and others around the
world.
73 Auto dejando sin efecto las comisiones rogatorias a la Republica de Guatemala (Jan 16, 2008),
Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n No. 1, Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias Previas 331/1999-10,
available online in Spanish at <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/pedrazl.html>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
74 Id.
75 Id at § 6 (translation by author).
76 In another innovation, the Spanish Public Prosecutor designated some of the eyewitnesses as
witnesses for the Spanish Crown, which allows Spain to pay their travel expenses. Given the
modest economic status of almost all the witnesses, this made it possible for them to testify.
Unpublished decision of Public Prosecutor, Audiencia Nacional.
77 Auto dejando sin efecto las comisiones rogatotias a la Republica de Guatemala (Jan 16, 2008)
(cited in note 73). The proper channels for submitting additional information or evidence
presumably would include Spanish consulates throughout the world.
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In February 2008, witnesses began arriving at the Spanish court. They
included experts, journalists, and eyewitnesses from some of the areas of the
country where, according to the CEH Report, acts of genocide were committed.
The eyewitnesses detailed massacres, rape, torture, bombings and persecution of
massacre survivors, destruction of crops and livestock, and targeting of Mayan
religious practices and community authorities. They also named specific military
officials, including the defendants, and specified their role in these crimes."8 The
witnesses spent a full week telling the judge their story. This in itself can have
reparatory effects7 9
The continuing political pressure and what is expected to be an ongoing
parade of witnesses will no doubt keep the issue in the public eye in Guatemala.
Whether this translates into effective change in the attitude of Guatemala's
prosecutors and judges is, at this point, unknown. It is of course more difficult
for such change to happen without at least a modicum of physical security for all
those involved.8° However, the pressure has already apparently had some result:
on February 25, Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom announced that he would
order the military to open up its archives from the armed conflict period and
turn them over to the Human Rights Ombudsman.8'
In April 2008 the proceedings took yet another turn. Guatemalan trial
court judge Jos6 Eduardo Cojulin, whose chambers had received Judge Pedraz's
repeated requests for a rogatory commission to interview witnesses, decided that
he would honor those requests. He reasoned that the GCC's decision had no
bearing on his international judicial cooperation obligations, and that, while he
could not allow Judge Pedraz to come to Guatemala, he could conduct the
interviews himself and forward the results to the Spanish court. He thus set out
a demanding schedule of witness interviews, beginning April 17.82 When
78 Gerson Ortiz, Declaran en Espana por genocidio, La Hora (Feb 5, 2008), available online at
<http://www.lahora.com.gt/notas.php?key=25579&fch=2008-02-05> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
79 There is extensive literature on truth-telling and its potential salutary effects for some victims. See,
for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge
2001). On the other hand, there is a risk that victims will end up frustrated by the continued
inability to acquire custody over the defendants and thus to proceed to full trial and sentencing.
The witnesses were well aware of that possibility and chose to testify nonetheless.
80 On March 5, 2008, unknown assailants shot at the house of the director of the Fundaci6n Nueva
Esperanza, Guillermo Chen. The Fundaci6n represents some of the witnesses and complainants
involved in the Spanish case. Amnesty International, Urgent Action, Public AI Index
34/006/2008 (Mar 7, 2008).
81 Antonio Ordonez, Presidente Colom ordena abrir archivos del ejdrdto, Prensa Libre (Feb 25, 2008),
available online at <http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2008/febrero/25/222513.html> (visited
Apr 5, 2008).
82 Gerson Ortiz, Se inida juiio contra genoddio, La Hora (Apr 17, 2008), available online at
<http://www.lahora.com.gt/notas.php?key=29121&fch=2008-04-17> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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witnesses told him they could not appear because they had no funds to travel to
the capital, he agreed to travel to them to take their statements. He rejected the
predictable amparos from the defendants. At this point, there are witnesses
testifying in both countries. It is possible that Judge Cojultin's actions will
eventually make their way up to the GCC, which can choose to reaffirm or
modify its earlier reasoning. It is also possible that the judge, hearing repeated
witness testimony of grievous crimes, will decide to take some action beyond
forwarding the testimony to Madrid.
In any case, along with internal pressure, the Spanish case has already
changed the national equation, bringing the issue again to the forefront of
national consciousness. Unless the GCC changes its mind or one of the named
defendants (or other defendants named in the future) leaves the country, the
case may never come to trial; Spain does not allow trial in absentia. Nonetheless,
the judge will continue taking testimony and eventually, if the evidence is
sufficient, is expected to issue individualized indictments (autos de procesamiento)
against these and, perhaps, other defendants. These indictments would set out
the evidence that the charged crimes were committed and that the defendants
were responsible, and at a minimum, they would serve as a valuable historical
record and a validation of the witness testimony. The indictments would also
serve as a powerful tool for lawyers, victims groups and even, if it so chose, the
Executive Branch in Guatemala to pursue new avenues of investigation and
prosecution.
V. ENTER CICIG: THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY
IN GUATEMALA
The Spanish litigation is not the only attempt to overcome the legacy of
impunity in Guatemala. As noted at the beginning, this impunity extends beyond
the former military and security force officials responsible for past human rights
violations to encompass present common crime, including (and especially) that
committed by powerful networks of drug traffickers, smugglers of all sorts,
extortion gangs, and car theft rings. In part, these are the same people: many of
the military intelligence and security force networks involved in human rights
violations transformed themselves, under weak civilian governments, into
criminal networks. 83 So impunity for past crimes and impunity in the present are
inextricably bound together.
83 For example, the Bush administration revoked the visas of two former chiefs of military
intelligence because of their links to drug trafficking. Frank Smyth, Guatemala, Home of Powerful
Drug Runners, Nieman Watchdog (Nov 20, 2005), available online at
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The result is a pervasive sense of insecurity, an almost completely
dysfunctional prosecution service, intimidation and corruption of judges and
prosecutors, and many powerful people with a vested interest in maintaining the
system in its current ineffective form. Most crimes are never even investigated;
only 2 percent are ever resolved. 4 Even in the few cases where convictions are
won, the defendants are often freed by mobs, mysteriously disappear before
serving time, or are allowed to run rackets in prison.8"
On January 16, 2003, NGOs together with the Guatemalan Human Rights
Ombudsman (Procurador) Sergio Fernando Morales Alvarado proposed the
creation of a Commission to Investigate Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security
Organizations ("CICIACS"). The proposal responded to "the clamor which has
been caused by the assassinations, threats and kidnappings of human rights
defenders, judges, magistrates, politicians, lawyers, Congressional advisers,
political leaders, journalists, priests, indigenous representatives and other
people."86 The President presented a bill to Congress creating CICIACS, but an
agreement between the government and the UN to establish CICIACS was
torpedoed when the GCC found it unconstitutional because the Guatemalan
Constitution reserves a prosecutorial role for the Public Prosecutor alone." It
took another two years to modify the plan to meet those objections, but on
December 11, 2006 the revised agreement between the UN and the Guatemalan
government creating a new version of CICIACS, known as CICIG, was signed.
The agreement was ratified by the Guatemalan Congress in August 2007 and
entered into force on September 4, 2007."
From the UN's perspective, the commitment to help end impunity at the
national level in this manner is an innovation. CICIG is "not a truth
<http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask-this.view&askthisid=001 52>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
84 Frank Jack Daniel and Mica Rosenberg, Crime-Ridden Guatemala Divided in Vote, Reuters (Nov 4,
2007), available online at <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN03610855>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
85 For example, Captain Jos6 Antonio Solares was convicted of ordering a massacre in Rio Negro,
but has never been "found" even though he continues to reside at home in plain sight. See
ADIVIMA pide que se cumpla la lyy se elecute la orden de aprehensidn dictada contra el Capitdn JosiAntonio
Solares por asesinato y genoddio (Oct 2004), available online at <http://www.derechos.net/
adivima/documentos/informes/ADIVIMA.doc> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
86 Roberto Garret6n, CICIG: An Innovative Mechanism, Human Rights First (2007), available online at
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/07730-hrd-garreton-article-translation.pdf> (visited Apr
5, 2008) (unofficial translation).
87 Id; GCC, decision of May 8, 2007, Expediente 791-2007.
88 SecretatT-General Appoints Head of Probe into IllegalArmed Groups in Guatemala, UN News Centre (Sept
14, 2007), available online at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23820&Cr=
guatemala&Crl => (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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commission, nor a special international tribunal, nor a classical technical
assistance program, but rather is fashioned to respond to critical needs not
always met by those kinds of measures."89 The idea draws, however, on two
ongoing anti-impunity efforts: the ICC and the UN's investigation into the
killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005.
The ICC was constructed to be complementary to national courts, which
have the primary responsibility to investigate and to prosecute genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. In Article 17, the Rome Statute sets out the
tests for whether a state is "unwilling or unable" to engage in its own
prosecutions; if it is neither unwilling nor unable, the Court has no jurisdiction.9"
But ICC prosecution, even if feasible,9' leaves open the question of what to do
with a state that is unable to prosecute, to build up that capacity. One idea is a
hybrid-but a hybrid investigative mechanism, not a hybrid court.
The idea of an UN-backed international investigatory commission to
supplement as well as to collaborate with national authorities was implemented
in response to the assassination of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri. The Security Council created the Independent Investigation Commission
("Commission"), based in Lebanon, with a three-month initial mandate (later
extended to two years) to assist the Lebanese authorities with criminal
investigation into the matter, including identifying the perpetrators.92 The
Commission had the power to subpoena documents, interview officials, and
report back to the Security Council on the results of its investigation.93 The
Council's Resolution noted "with concern the fact-finding mission's conclusion
that the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has
neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible
conclusion."94 Although it was clear from the start that part of the Security
89 CICIG, Background, Nature and Objectives of CICIG (2008) (unpublished document on file with
author). See also ONU en Guatemala, La CICIG estd ofidalmente instalada en Guatemala, available
online at <http://www.onu.org.gt/> (visited Apr 3, 2008).
90 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), arts 17-19, 37 ILM 1002.
91 The ICC only has jurisdiction under certain conditions: the crimes must have taken place before
July 2002 or the date the treaty comes into force for the relevant state. Unless the Security
Council refers the case, the consent of either the territorial state or the state of nationality of the
offender is required. Id, arts 12, 13.
92 Security Council Res No 1595, UN Doc S/RES/1595 (2005).
93 It did so in October 2005, and its mandate was extended under a new commissioner. The
investigation found heavy Syrian involvement in the Hariri killing. As a result of the investigation,
an international tribunal to seek justice in the Hariri and related cases is underway. See Jefferson
Morley, Background on Syria and the Rafiq Hariri Invesigation, Wash Post (Oct 21, 2005) available
online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/ AR2005101
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Council's concern was the likely involvement of Syria in the assassination, 9s the
Resolution itself is based solely on the needs and limitations of the Lebanese
government, not on any international aspects of the crime.
Unlike the Lebanese case, in Guatemala the agreement for an independent
investigatory commission did not emerge from the Security Council but rather
from talks between the government and UN officials, specifically the
Department of Political Affairs. 96 Article 1 of the Agreement between the
United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the Establishment of an
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala lists as its objectives:
(1)(a) To support, strengthen and assist institutions of the State of
Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly
committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and
clandestine security organizations and any other criminal conduct related to
these entities operating in the country, as well as identifying their structures,
activities, modes of operation and sources of financing and promoting the
dismantling of these organizations and the prosecution of individuals
involved in their activities;
(b) To establish such mechanisms and procedures as may be necessary
for the protection of the right to life and to personal integrity
pursuant to the international commitments of the State of Guatemala
with respect to the protection of fundamental rights and to international
instruments to which Guatemala is a party;
(c) To that end, an International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala shall be established pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement and the commitments of the State under national and
international human rights instruments, in particular the Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights [of the 1996 peace accords];
(d) For the purposes of this Agreement, illegal security groups and
clandestine security organizations shall mean those groups that:
(i) commit illegal acts in order to affect the full enjoyment and
exercise of civil and political rights and
(ii) are linked directly or indirectly to agents of the State or have the
capacity to generate impunity for their illegal actions.
97
CICIG is to "determine the existence of illegal security groups and clandestine
security organizations, their structure, forms of operation, sources of financing
and possible relation to State entities or agents and other sectors that threaten
civil and political rights in Guatemala, in conformity with the objectives of this
95 See Morley, Background on Sjria (cited in note 93).
96 See CICIG, Background (cited in note 89).
97 Agreement between the United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the Establishment of an International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Dec 12, 2006), art 1, available online at <www.un.org/
Depts/dpa/CJCIGEnglish.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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Agreement,"98 collaborate with the State in the dismantling of these groups,
promote the investigation, criminal prosecution, and punishment of those
crimes committed by their members, and recommend the adoption of public
policies for eradicating such groups and preventing their re-emergence.
To accomplish its goals, CICIG cannot directly prosecute crimes, but can
initiate criminal complaints, provide information to the Prosecutors' Office, and
act as a complementary prosecutor (querellante adhesivo) in criminal cases. 99 It can
subpoena documents, hire its own staff of investigators, file disciplinary
complaints against public servants, guarantee confidentiality to witnesses, and
publish its results. Once it is fully staffed there will be over 100 investigators; so
far the project has raised $21 million in voluntary contributions.'00 The UN
Secretary-General appoints the Commissioner, who is an Assistant Secretary
General, and he in turn is free to hire his own staff. The Guatemalan
government guarantees the safety of its personnel and of those who collaborate
with it.
On the other hand, the Commission is weakened by its inability to compel
testimony directly and by its dependence on the Public Prosecutor, who is the
only person who can actually take the cases to court. It will also depend on the
Guatemalan courts to act once the cases are being prosecuted. It will require a
delicate combination of cajoling, training, threatening, and shaming the
Prosecutors' Office (especially its higher level officials) and courts, as well as
sufficient international funding and backing, to make the project work. In
addition, to complement its prosecutorial work, CICIG can also recommend the
adoption of public policies and reforms."0"
On September 17, 2007, Carlos Castresana was appointed the CICIG
Commissioner. Castresana is a Spanish former anticorruption and antidrug
trafficking prosecutor who worked for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. He
was also the person who filed the first complaint in Spanish courts using that
country's universal jurisdiction law to investigate Latin American military
dictators; in 1996, he accused Argentina's military high command of genocide,
terrorism, and torture, in what would eventually become known as the
"Pinochet case."' 12 Presumably, he is well aware of the Guatemalan genocide
case before the Spanish courts. Although given his background he is presumably
98 Id, art 11 (1)(a).
99 Id.
100 Peace and Security Section UN Department of Public Information and Department of Political
Affairs, CICIG Fact Sheet Oan 28, 2008) (on file with author).
101 Id.
102 See Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect at ch 1 (cited in note 12).
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not opposed to prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction, the priorities of his
office will be elsewhere.
In its current form, CICIG will not focus on past crimes arising from the
1970s and 80s, although there is no explicit limitation in the mandate. However,
the organizers and leaders of illegal security groups and clandestine security
organizations are connected to, or one and the same as, former military officers
implicated in human rights violations or genocide. To this extent, the Spanish
investigation and CICIG's work may end up overlapping. Prosecutions of the
former military for more recent crimes would still be a victory for victims of
genocide, massacres, and disappearances, while advances in the genocide
prosecutions could disrupt at least some current crime networks. By pushing
from both ends, the present and the past, outside pressure may force action in
the Public Prosecutors' office to at least go through the motions of investigating
and prosecuting. It will take on-the-ground pressure from the CICIG
Commissioner and international insistence on concrete milestones and
achievements in both present and past prosecutions for those efforts (which will
no doubt be perfunctory at first) to take on a life of their own and actually bring
long-term improvement that is real.
VI. CONCLUSION
Impunity remains a core problem of post-armed conflict state building.
Guatemala exemplifies the process by which impunity for the crimes of the past
begets more impunity in the present; the two are linked. Early efforts to combat
impunity worldwide focused largely on the creation of new global institutions
like the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the ICC. As the limitations as
well as the strengths of those institutions have become clearer, a more
diversified and complex set of responses, grounded in the particular realities of
each state, have begun to proliferate. In particular, hybrid courts, with explicit
goals that include strengthening domestic legal systems and training local lawyers
in international criminal law, have emerged. Transnational prosecutions can
serve many of the same functions as these hybrid tribunals, although they suffer
from the same weaknesses as other international criminal justice mechanisms in
being able to apprehend suspects.
Moreover, international investigatory commissions and transnational
prosecutions, like those discussed here with respect to Guatemala, can play
complementary roles in catalyzing changes in domestic ability and will to
investigate and prosecute the powerful. The success of these mechanisms, like
that of international prosecutions more generally, should be measured not only
(or even principally) by how many convictions they secure, but at how well they
succeed in changing the possibilities for justice at home.
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